Russian Agents of Influence in Cyprus
Dmitri Khmelnitsky, Boris Demash. Rossiiskaya agentura vliyaniya na Kipre (Russian Agents of Influence in Cyprus). Berlin, 2025. 543 pages. In Russian.
The book looks at the foreign networks of Putin’s Russia: who runs them, how they are paid for and how closely they are tied to the FSB, the SVR and the GRU. The first part is a short history of the Soviet and Russian security services. The second describes the system Moscow built after 1991, from Rossotrudnichestvo and the emigrant associations to foundations, friendship societies, political parties and the online recruitment of young people. The third part is a study of one country, Cyprus, where these structures are easy to see because the island is small.
The book has an index of names, indexes of government and non-government organisations, and a list of sources.
Most chapters are published on this website in English, Russian and Ukrainian. The contents below link to them.
Contents
Part I. A short history of the Soviet and Russian security services
1. The state security organs in the first decade of Soviet power
2. Industrialisation and state security
3. The state security organs in the 1930s–1950s
4. State security after Stalin
5. State security after the USSR
Part II. After the USSR: how Russia built its system of agents of influence
6. Government agencies and organisations working with emigrants
7. Emigrant associations created by Moscow
9. Societies of friendship between Russia and foreign countries
11. Remote recruitment of young people
Part III. Russia's network of agents of influence in Cyprus
12. The Embassy and the ambassadors
13. The Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Nicosia
14. The ‘Russian House’ in Limassol
15. The Coordinating Council of Compatriots and its officials
16. The ‘Russian House’ expert club and Moscow’s Cypriot friends
17. The Cypriot town of Ayia Napa and its Russian friends
18. The ‘Russkiy Mir’ Foundation and its clients
19. Children, culture and spirituality
21. The Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society in Cyprus
22. Operation ‘House of Crimea in the European Union’
23. FSB conferences in Cyprus: generals and their agents
Appendices: index of names, index of government organisations, index of non-government organisations, sources.
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Preface
This book is about the security services of Putin’s Russia and its networks of agents of influence abroad, above all the networks. Intelligence and agents of influence are two sides of the same coin, but they operate in different conditions. Officers and agents of the Russian security services (the FSB, SVR and GRU) are watched by the counter-intelligence services of every country where they work, which makes their lives much harder. Legal networks of influence operating under the guise of public and non-governmental organisations (cultural, charitable, human rights groups and so on), by contrast, enjoy almost complete freedom. Yet in most cases the line between an intelligence officer and an agent of influence is a fine one.
Intelligence officers ‘weave networks’ without attracting attention. An agent of influence works openly; his task is to shape public opinion. That does not mean he will not gather purely intelligence information when the opportunity arises. It has always been so.
Kirill Khenkin, an outstanding expert on the foreign operations of the NKVD and the KGB, wrote in his book ‘The Russians Have Come’: ‘Yes, the line between direct Soviet espionage, the activities of paid agents of influence and friendly favours for comrades from the embassies was very blurred. In fact, there was no line at all. As there is none now.’ Khenkin’s ‘now’ refers to the 1980s, but it fits the first quarter of the twenty-first century just as well.
Moreover, in the Putin era the foreign activities of Moscow’s networks of influence, subordinate to the security services, have grown to a monstrous scale. In Soviet times they simply did not have such opportunities. The Iron Curtain kept the Soviet population ideologically innocent, but it also limited the possibility of building a truly mass network of agents abroad. Post-Soviet Russia was free of that obstacle.
Soviet emigrants were always a recruitment base for the Soviet security services: the emigration of the 1920s, refugees from the Civil War and Soviet ‘defectors’; the second, wartime emigration; and the third emigration of the 1960s to 1980s, the so-called ‘Jewish’ emigration, which the KGB created artificially. Kirill Khenkin himself belonged to the first emigration and was an NKVD officer who almost became a Soviet illegal intelligence officer. This is his assessment:
‘In the foreign-policy operations of the USSR, that is, in particular in its propaganda and intelligence operations, the Russian emigration always held a special place: as an adversary, as a victim, as a tool and as an ally.
The history of Soviet intelligence includes several high-profile cases in which the emigration played a central role. Moreover, once caught in the nets of Soviet espionage, it often became not only, and not so much, an object or tool for obtaining information, but, far more importantly, a means of psychological penetration. The emigration was not only won over to the Bolsheviks’ side; it was used to influence the West: to spread disinformation and confusion, to create a false picture of the situation in the country, to paralyse the will to resist. Through the emigration, Moscow to a large extent guided the thinking and the work of Western centres of information gathering and analysis and of decision-making.’
By the end of the 1980s, first-generation Soviet migrants scattered around the world, the main object of the security services’ attention, numbered hardly more than a few hundred thousand. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, millions of former Soviet citizens ended up abroad. The flow did not let up over the following three decades. The ‘organs’ were offered truly brilliant prospects, both in the boundless expansion of recruitment work and in its new methods. People no longer had to be recruited secretly and one at a time. Whole networks of agents of influence could be created openly in the form of public organisations. Such organisations had existed in the 1920s as various ‘societies of friendship with the USSR’, but they brought together very few people and they bore the stamp of belonging to the USSR.
International associations of Russian teachers, scientists, actors, lawyers, graduates of Soviet and Russian universities, Russian schools and even councils of Russian compatriots look neutral at first glance. They do not declare any ideological link with Russia, still less with the security services. Yet it was the security services that created them.
The first part of the book gives a brief history of the Soviet and Russian security services from the very beginning up to and including the Putin era.
The second part describes how Russia’s centralised network of agents of influence abroad developed in the post-Soviet and Putin years.
The third part shows how these organisations developed and operate in Cyprus. In principle they work in much the same way in every country, and to identify the agents themselves in any country it is enough to analyse the local network of branches of the central bodies.
As it happened, the authors knew the situation in Cyprus particularly well, so it made sense to begin the study there. In this respect Cyprus is a special place.
The Cypriot journalist Makarios Drousiotis wrote in his 2024 book ‘Putin’s Island’: ‘When I began collecting evidence that Cyprus had been a sacrificial lamb for Soviet and then Russian interests, my whole world was shattered, and I devoted myself to research to bring this truth to the wider public. The conclusion of my research is that Cyprus is perhaps the only example of a Western state that has been under Soviet and then Russian influence from its creation in 1960 to the present day without even realising it.’
Today Cyprus is a nature reserve for the Russian security services. They feel far more at ease here than in other EU countries and have practically a free hand. There are several reasons for this, but the main one is that after Russia’s war against Ukraine began, nobody touched them.
The other EU countries expelled hundreds of Russian intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover, restricted Russian propaganda media and introduced visa restrictions and sanctions. Cyprus did not. Hundreds of staff of the Russian Embassy and the ‘Russian House’ (reportedly about 300 people) carry on unhindered with their activities, which are first and foremost intelligence and propaganda.
It should be borne in mind that even in Soviet times 60 to 80 per cent of the staff of Soviet missions abroad were security service officers. Today there are probably even more. Besides, official diplomatic activity between Russia and the EU countries practically stopped after Russia attacked Ukraine. So all that is left for the staff of Russian missions is covert work: intelligence, propaganda, recruiting new agents and trying to destabilise the political situation in EU countries.
In this sense Cyprus has acquired special importance for Moscow for several reasons. First, the staff of the embassy has remained intact in both composition and numbers. Second, the ‘Russian Centre for Science and Culture’ (informally known as the ‘Russian House’) continues its work unhindered. It is a branch of the embassy open to the public that does nothing but propaganda and the recruitment of agents of Russian influence, all under the guise of ‘cultural activities’. And third, because of the particular nature of the Russian community in Cyprus.
In the early 1990s, when the USSR collapsed, there were no Russian citizens in Cyprus at all, only embassy officials and a small number of wives of Cypriots who had studied in the USSR. Today the number of post-Soviet Russian immigrants in Cyprus reaches 120,000, about half of whom hold Cypriot citizenship. That is around 10 per cent of the island’s population. There are very few former political or economic refugees among the Russians in Cyprus. On the other hand, the share of rich and very rich Russian migrants is probably higher than in any other country in the world.
It was mainly well-off Russians, businessmen and officials loyal to Putin’s regime, who moved to Cyprus with its offshore companies and the chance to obtain citizenship by buying property. Naturally, the concentration of security service personnel in Cyprus was extremely high from the start, above all because the ‘golden passports’ programme allowed hundreds of Putin’s officials, businessmen and agents of the Russian security services to enter Europe. Cyprus was also a convenient place for Putin’s oligarchs to keep their money. That meant a very high level of interaction with the local political and financial elite, which in turn opened up wide opportunities to influence the overall policy of the EU countries. This picture is confirmed by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, which worked on the recent leak of documents from several Cypriot financial firms.
Cyprus is not part of the Schengen area, so direct contacts between Russia and Cyprus have not suffered much during the years of the war against Ukraine. If anything, the opposite: entire IT companies moved from Russia to Cyprus with thousands of employees and their families. There is no reason to think that these people, usually young qualified engineers, are on the whole sympathetic to Putin’s regime, but unlike ordinary individual emigrants they depend on their employers. Characteristically, unlike Russian emigrants who fled Putin’s regime to other countries, the community of so-called ‘relocants’ in Cyprus is politically neutral. It shows almost no trace of opposition activity. In any case, this environment is extremely favourable for the work of Putin’s agents.
Besides, on small Cyprus the activities and connections of Russian agents are very visible and easy to study, like marine life in a small aquarium.
