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Gorbachev’s reforms, whose obvious aim from 1989 was to democratise the USSR and in effect remove the CPSU from power, also changed the role of the state security agencies dramatically. The repeal in September 1989 of the articles of the RSFSR Criminal Code punishing anti-Soviet views (70 and 190-1) deprived the KGB of the ability to terrorise the population, and the population of its fear of the KGB. Within a year the power of the CPSU was reduced to nothing and the Soviet Union began to fall apart. The final point in its existence was the agreement on ending the USSR (the Belovezha Accords) of 8 December 1991, signed by the leaders of three republics: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

The situation for the KGB was catastrophic. In place of the socialist camp and the USSR, very different states emerged after 1991. Some became fully democratic, and the former security services there were abolished. In others, medieval feudal despotisms arose. In still others, intermediate regimes appeared that changed their ideology but kept the former structure of state security and its aims. In the last years and months of the USSR’s existence, the KGB was concerned with taking under its protection and taking over the agent networks of the former socialist countries and former Soviet republics.

Gorbachev had no fundamental plans to dismantle the state security system or to purge its personnel. The whole system was preserved, but reformed. At first it was headed by people close to Gorbachev, for example Vadim Bakatin, who had previously been Minister of Internal Affairs. Bakatin was appointed chairman of the KGB after the August 1991 putsch, whose leaders included the then KGB chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov. Vadim Bakatin began reorganising the KGB. Its main principles were:

1. Disintegration: splitting the KGB into a number of independent agencies that would balance and compete with each other.

2. Decentralisation: giving the security agencies of the Union republics full independence.

3. De-ideologisation.

4. The main aim: fighting corruption and organised crime.

5. Openness, as far as possible.

In October 1991 the KGB was renamed the Inter-Republican Security Service of the USSR. The special forces, government protection (the future FSO), government communications (the future FAPSI, now again part of the FSB), foreign intelligence (the future SVR) and the Border Troops were removed from its control.

After the collapse of the USSR, in January 1993, the Ministry of Security of Russia was formed (on the basis of the Federal Security Agency of Russia, the successor to the KGB of the RSFSR, and the Inter-Republican Security Service of the USSR).

In 1993 the Ministry of Security was renamed the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service of Russia (FSK). It included all the former structures of the Ministry of Security except the Border Troops, which became an independent service, the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation. In 1995 the FSK was renamed the FSB without any change in structure. In the 1990s confusion reigned in the state security agencies. The two main purposes of their existence had disappeared:

1. After the ‘anti-Soviet’ articles of the Criminal Code were repealed in 1989, ideological terror became impossible: the agencies could no longer control the social and political life of society.

2. Subversive and intelligence work against the Western world lost its meaning, because Russia had become (for a short time) democratic with a full set of civil liberties, and the Western democracies had turned from enemies into allies, partners and investors.

Putin, on coming to power in 1999, began step by step to restore the Soviet order. Laws punishing anti-government protests and statements, as well as ‘false’ interpretations of Soviet and Russian history, appeared again.

Subversive and intelligence work against the West began to be carried out on an even larger scale than in Soviet times, especially as conditions for it were exceptionally favourable. It was made much easier by the end of the Iron Curtain and the emergence of a Russian-Soviet emigration numbering many millions in every country of the world. In the 1920s and 1930s Soviet intelligence (the INO of the OGPU) felt like a fish in water recruiting agents among the White emigration in Europe. Recruiting agents in today’s emigrant community has been even easier for the FSB: first, because the Soviet emigration in the world today is about ten times larger than the two-million-strong Russian emigration of the 1920s; second, because the emigrants themselves were brought up in the USSR. Accordingly, the opportunities for agents of the Russian security services to penetrate the political, business, financial and academic circles of the democratic world have increased greatly compared with Soviet times. And the tasks of Putin-era state security are exactly the same.

Under Putin, branches of state security working with various groups of emigrants abroad under the guise of public organisations have become enormously important, for example the Russkiy Mir Foundation, run by Molotov’s grandson Vyacheslav Nikonov. Moscow has created a huge number of networks of influence in countries around the world: quasi-public human rights, academic, literary and sports organisations run by the FSB and its offshoots. They are the subject of the next part.

The FSB under Putin numbers about 350,000 people (exact figures are secret). Of these, 66,200 are military personnel, including 8,000 FSB special forces (‘Alpha’, ‘Vympel’ and others). Add to that the FSB Border Service, with 160,000 to 220,000. The director of the FSB is Alexander Bortnikov. Foreign intelligence in Russia is carried out in parallel by the FSB, the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service, formerly the KGB’s First Chief Directorate) and the GRU (military intelligence).

In 2016 the Federal Service of the National Guard Troops (Rosgvardia) was created. It has 340,000 personnel. Its director is Army General Viktor Zolotov, a man very close to Putin. Rosgvardia reports to Putin, and its main task is to suppress political protests. It may be assumed that Rosgvardia is Putin’s main armed support and a competitor of the FSB.

Putin’s rule has greatly strengthened the role of the security services in the state. In Soviet times the KGB was subordinate to and fully controlled by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Under Putin the FSB became his personal agency and acquired enormous importance. In effect, Putin uses the FSB to control all state structures and society: business, the economy, culture. The FSB itself, meanwhile, is beyond any state control. ‘Former’ FSB officers are appointed to all important state posts, including ministerial ones. In all major enterprises, banks, research institutions and archives, the second (or even the first) posts are held by people from the FSB.

As in Soviet times, universities once again have special security departments that monitor international academic activity. All papers for international conferences must pass a censorship check before they are sent, and so on. The number of higher schools training security service personnel has grown greatly. First of all, as before, these are the FSB Academy (including the Institute of Cryptography), MGIMO, Moscow State University (the faculties of journalism and history) and the Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN), but also many other institutions.

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