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Stalin’s industrialisation (from the late 1920s through the 1930s) was traditionally presented by Soviet historiography, as by Soviet propaganda, as a way of raising the economy of the USSR to world level. That was a deliberate lie.

Under normal conditions economic growth is accompanied by the development of trade and leisure infrastructure, rising consumption and higher living standards. Industrialising the economy means, first of all, industrialising the production of consumer goods.

In the USSR everything was the other way round. The sharp growth of productive capacity was accompanied by the abolition of trade, a rapid fall in the production of consumer goods, the reduction of consumption to a bare minimum and, accordingly, a catastrophic decline in living standards.

Soviet ‘industrialisation’ had nothing to do with developing the country’s economy; on the contrary, it ruled it out. The plans of the first five-year plans were plans to build the largest mechanised army in the world, with everything needed to support it, in about ten years, that is, in two five-year plans.

Under the NEP (New Economic Policy), Stalin did not and could not have the means to carry out these plans: neither money nor labour. Taxes and revenue from nationalised large-scale industry, private agriculture, private small industry and trade were barely enough to maintain the state apparatus and to keep the existing military industry at its previous level, more or less safe for neighbouring countries. The first drafts of the first five-year plan were developed in parallel from 1926 in the Supreme Council of the National Economy, the VSNKh (for state industry, headed by Abram Ginzburg), and in the State Planning Committee of the USSR (for the whole economy, headed by Stanislav Strumilin). The first five-year plan was approved in May 1929 at the Fifth Congress of Soviets of the USSR, but by then it had almost nothing in common with the original versions. There were six or seven drafts in all, produced under mounting pressure from Stalin’s group in the Politburo.

Over those four years the political regime in the USSR changed, as did the state’s economic principles, and with them the aims and methods of drawing up the first five-year plan.

The dictatorship of the Politburo established after Lenin’s death, whose members were not united in their views on the future economic policy of the government, gave way to Stalin’s one-man dictatorship.

The line of continuing and developing Lenin’s New Economic Policy, defended by the ‘right-wing communists’ who formed the majority of the Politburo until 1928, was replaced by Stalin’s line of abolishing the NEP, introducing universal forced labour and concentrating all resources on building heavy (in effect, military) industry, which was by no means designed to provide the population with the necessities of life.

The first five-year plan drafts, prepared by supporters of the NEP, assumed balanced and interconnected growth of agriculture and industry, each providing the other with what it needed, and, as a consequence, a gradual rise in living standards. The Bolsheviks’ expansionist plans and dreams of ‘world revolution’ were equally dear to all Soviet leaders. The difference was that the ‘right’, led by Sovnarkom chairman Alexei Rykov (they included Dzerzhinsky, who from 1924 combined leadership of the OGPU with the chairmanship of the VSNKh), were not prepared to wreck the Soviet economy, which had only just begun to recover, for the sake of rapid militarisation of the country, as the ‘left’ led by Leon Trotsky demanded. In the internal political struggle Stalin sided with the ‘right’, but after Trotsky’s defeat and removal from power he gained a majority in the Politburo, acquired absolute power and began to implement Trotsky’s ideas, and in their most extreme form. Dzerzhinsky died in 1926; his successor as chairman of the VSNKh, Valerian Kuibyshev, was Stalin’s protégé.

The five-year plan approved in 1929 had lost any connection with meaningful economic calculations. It combined unnaturally high mandatory targets for industrial growth, which were to be met at any cost, with purely fictitious and fantastic targets for labour productivity, consumption, housing construction and so on, which were never meant to be met. The former completely ruled out the latter. Stalin’s industrial production plans could be fulfilled only at the expense of the population. All those who drew up the five-year plans understood this.

The first authors of the five-year plans were convicted at the ‘Menshevik trial’ in 1931. The survivors lived by the aphorism attributed to Stanislav Strumilin, who at the initial stage directed the drafting of the five-year plans at the State Planning Committee: ‘Better to stand for high growth rates than to sit [in prison] for low ones.’

The Soviet repressions of the late 1920s and the 1930s were programmed into the first and subsequent five-year plans, in the sections dealing with the planned increase in the urban population, the reduction of the rural population and the supply of labour to the five-year-plan construction sites. There was nothing natural about these processes. Under the industrialisation plans, new industrial plants were located near raw materials and energy sources; the availability of labour was not taken into account, since workers were to be brought in as needed. In any case, there were no reserves of free labour on that scale in the USSR at the end of the 1920s. The only way to solve the problem was to move the rural population and ‘surplus’ town dwellers to the construction sites by force. The methods could only be punitive, that is, carried out by the OGPU.

Stalin’s collectivisation of agriculture, launched in 1928, served the same purpose. The various collective farms that existed in the mid-1920s, which united about two per cent of all peasants, had by then completely discredited themselves economically. Despite state privileges, their productivity was far lower than that of private peasant farms. All the economists drafting the five-year plans knew this perfectly well. In ‘collectivising’ the countryside, the government was not planning to increase agricultural output; that would have required the opposite measures. The aim was to increase the production of food that the authorities could take from the countryside practically free of charge and without organisational difficulty. With private peasant farms this trick did not work. ‘Socialising’ peasant farms solved the government’s problems but automatically led to the degradation of agriculture as a whole and a sharp drop in agricultural output.

The collective farms were deliberately organised so as to make it as easy as possible for the government to take all agricultural produce from the countryside and to move labour around freely. From the collective farms, run by party appointees, it was easy to draw any number of workers for building industrial plants, logging, roads and so on. This was done in various ways, including the deportation of so-called kulaks, forced recruitment and seasonal labour mobilisations. The collective farm management simply received an order to supply a given number of workers, for whom the state paid the collective farm. Such a system could not have existed without the terror of the OGPU.

In the five-year plan drawn up in 1927 at the State Planning Committee under Stanislav Strumilin, the growth of the urban population over the five years was estimated at one million people, and the inflow of the rural population into the towns was planned at 500,000 a year or even less. These figures reflected the natural migration to the towns of the mid-1920s.

Under Stalin’s five-year plan adopted in 1929, the urban population was to grow by 1931/32 to 34.7 million people, that is, by 6.8 million (growth of 24.4 per cent, or 1.4 million a year).

In reality, according to the results of the first five-year plan, the urban population in 1932 was 38.7 million, having increased by 13 million since 1927.

The agricultural population fell from 119.9 million in 1927 to 117.2 million (Ginzburg’s plan had envisaged growth to 130.1 million).

The collective farm population increased 33-fold from 1928 (from 2 million to 66.7 million).

The number of workers in large-scale industry doubled from 1928, reaching 6.311 million.

The total number of wage earners increased by 11 million, 10 million more than Ginzburg’s 1927 plan had envisaged. Private trade and small-scale industry disappeared almost completely. The people employed in them were used as hired labour in the socialised sector of the economy. As a result, the USSR stopped producing almost all the household goods that small industry and private trade had previously supplied to the population. In 1930 private trade was replaced by closed distribution outlets that supplied food and basic goods only to their own employees and workers. Living standards fell to the lowest possible level and below; hence the victims of the famine of 1931–33. It was not only the peasants, hit first and hardest by collectivisation, who starved, but town dwellers too: their lives depended entirely on ration cards, which could be obtained only at their workplaces.

Thus, by the end of the first five-year plan, the Soviet government had managed to subjugate almost the entire urban and rural population of the country and force it to carry out the industrialisation plans. This could be done only with the help of a powerful punitive system, the OGPU.

From 1928 onwards, Soviet economic planning freely handled masses of millions of people, who were moved around the country at will according to the needs of the plan and/or taken from the countryside for the needs of industrial production.

A typical example is the calculation of labour resources for the Urals region in the second five-year plan, published in 1932 in B. I. Evenchik’s book ‘The Urals in the Plan of the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine’. The book was based on the author’s reports published in the autumn of 1930. According to the Uralplan data cited in the book, the region’s total population, 7.686 million in 1931, was to grow to 11.023 million by 1938, that is, by 3.337 million. Natural population growth, however, was estimated at only 1.282 million:

‘In addition, an inflow of population from outside the region of 2,055 thousand people is planned, including 1,478 thousand of working age. Only under this condition, and on condition that women are fully involved in production, that the number of people employed in agriculture is reduced from 1,976 thousand in 1931 to 1,185 thousand in 1937 and that 919 thousand people are released from agriculture for industry, only under these conditions can the Urals’ need for labour be met.’ So fulfilment of the second five-year plan depended on the forced relocation to the Urals of two million people from outside over seven years and on taking almost a million people out of agriculture within the region itself. One hundred per cent involvement of women in production was also assumed. Evenchik’s book says not a word about the methods for achieving these aims, but they were no secret either to the author or to his readers. The methods could only be punitive and coercive.

In publications of the first five-year plan period (and even more so in later ones) it is extremely difficult to find any indication of the real aims and methods of breaking up the country’s social structure and introducing mass forced labour. An exception is Emmanuil Kviring’s book ‘The Tasks of Building Socialism in the USSR. On the General Plan for 10–15 Years’, published in 1931. At the time of writing the author was deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, and before that, in 1925–27, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine.

Kviring’s book lists and describes all the forms of forced labour that were being developed and used at the time: planned forcible movement of workers around the country, compulsory allocation of workers by collective farms for urban construction, labour mobilisations, labour armies, universal labour service, and the labour of repressed ‘special settlers’ and prisoners:

‘Most probably, alongside the organised allocation of surplus labour by the collective farms for transfer to construction, the question of mobile labour armies must be raised. <…> It is quite possible that in the coming years, in order to regulate the labour market, it will be necessary to create groups of workers under labour service who can be transferred to weak sectors. <…> There is the question of labour service for all citizens, both men and women, of a certain age. Experience will show whether six months or, say, a year will be a sufficient term for this service. Such an army of several hundred thousand people will be quite enough to regulate the proper use of labour across the country. <…> I leave aside here the question of forced labour for socially dangerous elements. For many years, even after the liquidation of classes, there will be the question of former landowners, capitalists, kulaks and NEP-men. <…> The struggle here does not end with the liquidation of classes. Those liquidated do not want to accept that they are former people. Moreover, at any move by the capitalist countries against us, these former people will step up their activity.

We must prevent any possibility of this group stabbing us in the back. At the same time we must put these people in working conditions so that they are not parasites. <…> I have already written above about “areas of restricted rights”. Such areas, it seems to me, will naturally grow out of today’s concentration camps. <…> Unlike the ordinary commune of the future, in such areas people will, first, be restricted in their freedom of movement; second, they will be deprived of the right to vote; and third, the state will direct economic work through its representatives.’

Most likely Kviring’s book was published by mistake, bypassing censorship. In any case, terms such as ‘concentration camps’, ‘labour service’ and ‘labour armies’ very rarely appear in later (or, for that matter, earlier) open publications.

It may be assumed that Kviring’s book reflected details of discussions on the use of labour resources at the top of the party in 1930–31. The idea of introducing universal labour service for a period of six months to a year was apparently discussed seriously. But preference was given to creating labour armies of prisoners and special settlers. The Gulag was set up in April 1930, just when Kviring’s book was being written or was already being prepared for print.

As Pavel Polyan writes, the idea of forced labour and forced resettlement was first ‘voiced in 1928 by the deputy People’s Commissar of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection of the RSFSR, N. M. Yanson, who proposed making more vigorous use of the labour of convicts (“criminal prisoners”) in developing remote lands, especially in logging. In 1930 the same Yanson (by then People’s Commissar of Justice of the RSFSR), analysing the latest trends in the prison and camp system of the RSFSR for 1929, noted in particular a general rise in the number of convicts (to 1.2 million), a fall in the share of those sentenced to short terms (up to one year), a sharp rise in sentences to forced labour (to 50.3 per cent against 15.3 per cent in 1928), and the start of transfers of prisoners from prisons and corrective houses to OGPU corrective labour camps set up on a self-financing basis (within a year the number of prisoners in them reached 166,000; another 60,000 or so convicts worked in the corrective labour colonies of the NKVD of the RSFSR). At the same time he and People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs V. N. Tolmachev claimed that the labour of “zeks” was efficient and their output often higher than that of free workers <…> Clearly, such a successfully launched experiment had a “great future” ahead of it.’

From 1930 the Gulag and the entire OGPU-NKVD system grew rapidly. In 1938 an independent chief directorate, Dalstroy (the Chief Directorate for Construction in the Far North), appeared. In 1940–1941 the NKVD went through an organisational reform. New industrial chief directorates were created: the Chief Directorate of the Camp Timber Industry, the Chief Directorate of Camps for Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises, the Chief Directorate of Camps for Railway Construction, the Chief Directorate for Airfield Construction, the Chief Directorate of Camps for Industrial Construction (Glavpromstroy) and the Chief Directorate of Camps for Hydraulic Construction (Glavgidrostroy). By the end of 1948 there were 79 camp complexes in the country, and by 1953 the NKVD-MGB (Ministry of State Security) system already had 16 industrial chief directorates and 166 camp complexes.

By 1941 the number of prisoners in the USSR had reached almost 2 million (as many as all the industrial workers in the USSR fifteen years earlier). During the war the number of prisoners fell to 1.18 million in 1944 (with annual mortality reaching 23 per cent). After the war it began to rise again, to 2.5 million in 1953. Quite clearly, the number of prisoners in the USSR depended directly on the OGPU-NKVD-MGB’s need for labour, and the repressions were planned.

The total number of workers and employees in the economy in 1950 was 40.4 million: ‘Of the 2.5 million prisoners in the camps and colonies of the Gulag, about 2 million were fit for work. Thus the labour pool of the camps and colonies amounted to just over 6 per cent of the all-Union total. Meanwhile, over the period 1935–1953 the NKVD accounted on average for 8.6 per cent of all capital construction in the Union.’

Figures on the share of camp production in the Soviet economy do not in themselves fully reflect its importance for Stalin’s economy. Prisoners were used for tasks that could not have been accomplished by ordinary means, with free hired labour. Above all this meant logging and building canals, roads, mines and military-industrial plants in uninhabited and remote parts of the USSR.

Almost immediately after Stalin’s death in March 1953 the new government reformed the Soviet camp system. Many of Stalin’s costly purely military projects were cancelled and an amnesty was declared, which freed 1.2 million people. As a result of further releases, the number of prisoners fell below one million by 1956. In 1956 the Gulag was renamed the Chief Directorate of Corrective Labour Colonies, and in 1959 the Chief Directorate of Places of Detention of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. By then prison labour no longer played a significant role in the Soviet economy.

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