‘The first task that the special forces units and divisions had to solve was penetration into enemy territory.’

Viktor Suvorov, ‘Soviet Military Intelligence’, Moscow, 2016, p. 471.

In Germany, the press first drew attention to the Russian martial arts schools ‘Systema’ in 2014. The first was FOCUS magazine, which suggested that the Soviet military intelligence GRU was recruiting agents from sports schools that were training in martial arts developed by the GRU special forces (Spetsnaz GRU).

At the time, this information attracted little attention. Interest was rekindled after the publication in the spring of 2016 of Boris Reitschuster's book, ‘Putin's Hidden War,’ which cited data from German secret services regarding the existence of special groups of trained terrorist fighters, GRU agents, within the country.

However, it's impossible to take any official action, since neither the Sistema schools themselves nor the athletes who train there are breaking any laws. And the schools' very connection to Russian military intelligence seems absurd to the untrained eye.

This exotic situation deserves closer examination. Military art is divided, both in theory and practice, into three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. ‘Everything related to the combat operations and weapons of units and subunits up to and including divisions is the tactical level. The combat operations and weapons of corps, armies, military districts, fronts, and fleets are the operational level. Everything above the front is the strategic level.’ Accordingly, military intelligence activities are also divided into three levels. The tactical level comprises reconnaissance companies and reconnaissance battalions within divisions.

‘Operational intelligence is military intelligence at the level of army corps, combined arms, tank and air armies, military districts, fleets, and, in wartime, fronts.’

The highest level of strategic intelligence was the GRU General Staff. It included directorates responsible for gathering and processing information in all countries of the world.

The First Deputy Chief of the GRU had six production directorates reporting to him. Five of them (the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth) were engaged in human intelligence. The first four directorates conducted their intelligence from the territory of hostile and neutral states, while the fifth conducted it from the territory of the Soviet Union and its subordinate states.

The First Directorate was engaged in intelligence operations in Western European countries, except Great Britain.

The Second Directorate conducted intelligence operations in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

The Third Directorate covers Asia. The Fourth Directorate covers Africa and Latin America.

These directorates had a roughly identical structure. They consisted of four to five departments, each of which conducted intelligence operations in specific countries. The directorate head supervised the work of the departments and one or two illegal residencies that were independent of the departments. The head of each department, in turn, supervised five to seven diplomatic and one to two illegal residencies.

The production directorates' divisions consisted of four to six sections, each of which conducted intelligence in a specific country and coordinated and oversaw the ongoing work of a GRU residency (or two or more residencies) in that country. It's worth noting that although each directorate collected intelligence information and materials within its assigned territory, it also acquired information about the entire world, including events occurring outside its area of ​​operation.

Each of these directorates employed approximately 600 officers; 300 of them were based in Moscow (mostly people who had already worked in their respective countries or were preparing to go there on assignment) and 300 were based abroad.

The Fifth Directorate controlled the work of operational intelligence, that is, the intelligence directorates and departments of four groups of forces, sixteen military districts and all combined arms, tank and air armies.

The Sixth Directorate was responsible for radio and electronic intelligence. Its officers worked in undercover residencies in foreign capitals, intercepting and decrypting messages on government and military communications networks. Furthermore, numerous radio and electronic intelligence units were located in the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries, which were also part of the Sixth Directorate. This directorate also supervised radio and electronic intelligence for military districts, groups of forces, and fleets (the fifth departments of the respective headquarters), which, in turn, had their own units, specialised ships, aircraft, and helicopters for conducting such reconnaissance. The radio and electronic intelligence departments of each military district, group of forces, or fleet supervised the work of the fifth army groups and flotillas, which in turn supervised similar units within the divisions…

GRU Spetsnaz (SpN) units were created in the late 1940s. Initially, they grew into companies, then battalions and brigades. These were sabotage units, primarily aimed at combating enemy nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

"If the task of searching for and destroying targets of the first category was completed, the special forces units were planned to switch to searching for and destroying targets of the second category, which included: <…> headquarters and command posts; <…> communication nodes and lines; <…> gas pipelines, power plants, power lines, oil pipelines, oil and gas storage facilities; infrastructure elements: airfields and airports, bridges, tunnels, railways.

In addition, an important task was the general terror in the enemy rear, which created an atmosphere of suspicion, uncertainty and fear, sowing panic and disorganizing the armed forces and the enemy population.

During the period of deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union for war, the Special Forces units were to take the following form:

The GRU was to have three Spetsnaz regiments under its direct control. Each regiment comprised six to seven Spetsnaz companies. These regiments, unlike other Spetsnaz units, could use portable nuclear warheads (so-called ‘nuclear backpacks’).

Each front had a special forces reconnaissance point and one special forces brigade. Each fleet had a special forces reconnaissance point and one special forces naval brigade. This brigade included a group of midget submarines, a paratrooper battalion, and two or three battalions of combat swimmers.

Each combined arms and tank army had a separate special forces company.

It was intended to have several separate special forces battalions as a general reserve to reinforce those troops that were operating in the most important areas, or those troops that had suffered serious losses.

During a strategic offensive operation, each Soviet motorized rifle and tank battalion could send forward one motorized rifle or tank company to conduct reconnaissance.

In addition, each motorized rifle and tank regiment sent forward one reconnaissance company.

Each motorized rifle and tank division sent forward two reconnaissance companies armed with tanks and BRDMs, and one deep reconnaissance company from its reconnaissance battalion.

Each combined arms and tank army deployed one special forces company into the enemy rear, which could operate either in full force or in small groups (the maximum number of such groups was 15) at a depth of 100 to 500 kilometers.

Each front deployed a special forces brigade behind enemy lines, operating at depths of 500 to 1,000 kilometers. A brigade could form up to 195 (if the brigade consisted of four battalions and a headquarters company) or up to 285 small groups (if the brigade consisted of six battalions and a headquarters company).

A front typically consisted of one tank army and three or four combined arms armies. These armies could deploy 60–75 special forces groups into the enemy rear.

In total, the front and the armies that were part of it could simultaneously deploy from 255 to 360 special forces sabotage groups with a total number of 1,600 to 2,400 saboteurs, as well as ‘dormant’ special forces agents.

The Soviet command planned for a strategic offensive operation to be carried out by three or four fronts and one fleet. In the direction of the main attack, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief could deploy sabotage groups from Spetsnaz regiments directly subordinate to the Chief of the GRU into the enemy's rear.

In total, the Soviet Union had four naval special forces brigades (one in each fleet), sixteen special forces brigades (one in each group of forces and main military districts), and forty-one separate special forces companies. This means that even in peacetime, the country had between 23,000 and 30,000 first-class saboteurs at its disposal, and as a result of mobilisation, this number could increase four to five times by conscripting those who had already served in these units and formations.

Spetsnaz units and formations were the true elite of the Soviet armed forces. The finest soldiers and officers served here. On Soviet territory, they typically wore the uniform of the Airborne Forces, while on Warsaw Pact territory, they wore the uniform of some ‘auxiliary’ branch of the armed forces, most often the Signal Corps. Of course, in reality, they had no connection with the Airborne Forces or Signal Corps: the Airborne Forces reported to the Airborne Forces Commander (who, in turn, reported to the USSR Minister of Defence), were in the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's reserves, and acted exclusively in his interests at the strategic level, while Spetsnaz units and formations acted at the operational level in the interests of the fronts, fleets, and armies.

The Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School trained officers for the Special Forces units.

The Third Faculty of the Military-Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army trained officers for the Special Forces intelligence posts.

By arming the Special Forces regiments with portable nuclear charges, the Soviet Army was in fact planning to use the Special Forces units as an alternative means of delivering nuclear weapons, which was not generally discussed."

The above information, taken from Viktor Suvorov's book ‘Soviet Military Intelligence,’ pertains to the Soviet era, but there is no reason to believe that the methods and reconnaissance and sabotage activities of the Russian army, nor its objectives, have changed significantly over the past thirty years. The conditions of this activity have changed due to the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.

During Soviet times, the GRU conducted intelligence operations against the Federal Republic of Germany from East German territory. In the late 1980s, there was one intelligence centre (in Wünsdorf) and four intelligence posts in the GDR: in Rostock, Magdeburg, Leipzig, and Dresden.

Here is how a former GRU officer, who worked at the intelligence point in Magdeburg from 1987 to 1989, describes the activities of operational intelligence: "Depending on the rank and position at the intelligence point, the general part of the work plan was formulated as follows: "Conducting intelligence activities in the intelligence zone designated for the intelligence point in accordance with the following areas: obtaining information on the activities of the Bundeswehr and allied armies (this meant routine combat training in the reconnaissance zone, conducting tactical, operational and strategic exercises), promptly bringing the troops of the Bundeswehr and allied armies to a state of higher combat readiness, especially in units armed with nuclear weapons, obtaining information on the development and rearmament of units of the Bundeswehr and allied armies with new weapons systems, etc."

During my service at the GRU intelligence station in Magdeburg, the territory of the FRG, as the main intelligence target, was divided into so-called intelligence zones, each of which was under the responsibility of a specific intelligence station.

For example, the GRU intelligence point in Rostock (Fieteschulzestrasse, tel. 2505, 23012) was responsible for reconnaissance in a strip with the following borders: south of the coast of the Baltic and North Seas on the territory of the FRG, north of Osterburg, Hanover, Münster and Venlo (all cities - not including).

The reconnaissance point in Magdeburg (until January 1, 1991 on Gerhard-Hauptmannstrasse) was responsible for reconnaissance in a strip with the following boundaries: south of Osterburg, Hanover, Münster, Venlo (inclusive), north of Nashtetten, Mühlhausen, Giessen, Bitburg (not including).

The main reconnaissance targets of the Magdeburg reconnaissance point in the above-mentioned reconnaissance zone included the following units and formations: the 1st Corps of the FRG ground forces with headquarters in Münster, the 3rd Corps of the FRG ground forces with headquarters in Koblenz, the 1st Corps of the British ground forces with headquarters near Dortmund, as well as all units of the armed forces of Belgium and the Netherlands stationed in this zone.

In addition to a reconnaissance zone within the FRG, each intelligence point was also assigned a specific area within the GDR, from which direct intelligence work was conducted within the reconnaissance zone in West Germany. Thus, GRU units and subdivisions in the operational sphere could recruit agents only from among GDR residents, as well as Western citizens, but only within the GDR. The zones of responsibility within the GDR generally encompassed large areas, usually coinciding with the territory of the district in which a given intelligence point was located.

But it often happened that the area of ​​responsibility of a given intelligence point encompassed settlements located in another district; this was perfectly normal. For example, the Magdeburg intelligence point's area of ​​responsibility included cities located outside the Magdeburg district, such as Nordhausen or Stendal. Areas of responsibility within the GDR were accordingly divided into sectors among the intelligence point staff. Within their ‘personal’ sector, each intelligence point operational officer, relying on cooperation with GDR party and government institutions, conducted targeted recruitment activities among citizens of the GDR and FRG.

Constant, targeted work with already recruited sources in a given locality, who had relatives, acquaintances, etc., in neighboring localities, automatically led to the sectors of responsibility of individual operational officers, and therefore the area of ​​responsibility of the entire intelligence unit, constantly expanding to new localities. A quick look at the map showing the sectors of responsibility of the operational officers of the GRU intelligence unit in Magdeburg clearly shows that the intelligence unit tended to form entire groups: Halberstadt, Wernigerode, Haldensleben, Wolmirstedt, Aschersleben, Stassfurt, Bernburg, Köthen, Dessau, Rosslau, and so on.

Before the events of October 1989, there was a trend toward expanding the number of agent networks in the GDR. After the severing of cooperation with GDR state institutions, this process rapidly and sharply declined. The focus was no longer on expanding agent networks, but on rescuing already recruited sources. <…> The core of each GRU intelligence centre consisted of so-called operational officers or agent officers, whose number in all intelligence centres in the former GDR, with the exception of the GRU intelligence centre in Karlshorst (East Berlin), ranged from 15 to 20. They recruited agents and obtained intelligence information.

<…> the average GRU intelligence post (including conscripts) usually consisted of 35 to 40 people."

This is how Yuri Pushkin describes the activities of GRU intelligence centres engaged in human intelligence. Spetsnaz units had their own intelligence system.

The Third Department of the District Headquarters' Intelligence Directorate commanded the Special Forces units. It was in charge of the Special Forces brigade and the Special Forces reconnaissance post. The so-called special intelligence (SpN intelligence), which this department handled, was the most effective operational intelligence tool. It relied on two key elements: the SpN agents and the SpN troops.

Each SpN intelligence post (RP – D.Kh.) oversaw the recruitment, training, and management of terrorist agents. <…> SpN agents were extremely diverse. Overall, the recruitment process and work with such agents was no different from work with regular operational intelligence agents.

However, the tasks of the Spetsnaz agents were fundamentally different. The primary job of a procuring agent is to obtain information needed by military intelligence. The task of a Spetsnaz agent is to carry out sabotage on enemy territory.

First of all, these were raiders. They weren't agents in the strict sense of the word (as used by strategic military intelligence), because they were Soviet citizens, and an agent, by definition, was a citizen of a foreign state. Nevertheless, they were also considered Spetsnaz agents because they weren't regular military personnel. Raiders were trained to operate alone and in small groups. Their job was to attack energy systems (power plants, transformers, power lines), water supply and sewerage facilities, oil and gas pipelines, bridges and tunnels. <…> Foreign origins were valued. <…> When selecting a Soviet person with some kind of foreign (for example, Greek or Turkish) roots, it was necessary to find someone who, if he appeared on foreign soil during the war, no one would ask the question: ‘Why aren't you in the army?’ <…> The training of a new person fell into two parts. Firstly, it was necessary to train him in the craft of sabotage, secondly, to come up with a legend for him and prepare legalisation documents.

<…>The second main type of SpN combat agent was conventionally called ‘homeowners.’ This type of agent was, in a sense, more difficult to recruit, because these agents were citizens of the country the Soviet Union intended to liberate from the shackles of capitalism.

The RP SpN officers had very limited opportunities to recruit citizens of foreign countries, so this work fell to strategic intelligence officers working in foreign countries under various cover.

On the other hand, the recruitment of such agents was made easier by the fact that the recruitment base was much broader.

Imagine this: during a war, or in the very last days before it, we deploy hundreds of special forces sabotage groups behind enemy lines. They hide in the forests, are hunted with dogs, caught, and exterminated. A small number of these groups carry out particularly important missions. For these critical groups, shelters must be created even in peacetime, where they can hide for a while.

Here's one possible option for such a refuge. Outside the city, near the forest, there's a junkyard for old cars. The junkyard is surrounded by a fence. <…> Such a place, if the owner were successfully recruited, would be ideal for a temporary residence for a Spetsnaz group. <…> The key is that the owner risks nothing; he's not doing anything suspicious or illegal. But his junkyard is a secret base for Spetsnaz fighters. <…> Among the Spetsnaz agents could have been saboteurs, who were primarily recruited from among the employees of important enemy industrial enterprises and transportation facilities. Once recruited by Soviet military intelligence, they had to be ready to carry out sabotage upon receiving the appropriate order. <…> These Spetsnaz agents were the so-called "dormant" or "sleeping" agent network, which was inactive during peacetime and instantly activated on the eve of military action. Operational intelligence tried to limit contacts with these agents and conducted personal meetings with them only in exceptional cases."

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The collapse of the USSR and the dismantling of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe forced the GRU to relocate its bases to the Russian Federation. On the one hand, this meant a partial loss of its already established intelligence networks. On the other, it opened up opportunities previously only dreamed of.

The lifting of the Iron Curtain opened the entire world to residents of the former USSR, including secret service agents. Access to Western Europe became extremely easy for officers and agents of the GRU, FSB, and other secret services, which proliferated after the collapse of the USSR. In the 1990s, millions of former Soviet citizens moved permanently to Germany alone, greatly facilitating both the deployment of intelligence officers under a variety of cover identities and the recruitment of agents.

There is no longer a need to prepare complex border crossing operations and infiltrate special services into the territory of a potential enemy.

On the western side, control over the flow of various migrants and tourists from the East ceased completely. On the eastern side, however, the registration of those leaving and the selection of potential recruiters could be carried out in full force and on a massive scale, commensurate with the strength of the flow itself.

The creation of the international network of sports schools ‘Systema,’ promoting special forces martial arts, can be seen as one of the GRU's most effective operations in the post-Soviet era. In any case, ‘Systema’ is a completely obvious way to solve the operational intelligence tasks described above. Moreover, the method is virtually completely safe, extremely attractive to potential recruits, and doesn't even require special secrecy.